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NOTES
ADJUDICATION OF INTERCORPORATE CLAIMS UNDER
THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT*
SECTION 11(b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 is
designed to eliminate inequitable distribution of voting power and un-
necessary complexities of corporate structure by the recapitalization of pub-
lic utility holding company systems. 1 In effectuating these purposes the
Securities and Exchange Commission, as administrator of the Act, has con-
sidered it essential to determine the validity and amount of intra-system
claims, which heretofore, as choses in action, have been adjudicable only by
the courts. 2 When its jurisdiction was first challenged by attempts to secure
independent judicial relief, the SEC urged that it had primary jurisdiction
on the theory that Section 11(b) (2) vested it with exclusive authority to de-
termine these intercorporate claims, or, alternatively, that, since an adequate
remedy at law existed before the Commission, a suit in equity could not
be maintained.3 But both these theories have received short shrift. While
* J. C. F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas & Elect. Corp., 181 Misc. 283,46 N. Y. S. (2d)
605 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd mwm., 267 App. Div. 863, 47 X. Y. S. (2d) 303 (1st Dep't 19.t4),
nwtion for leave to appeal denied, 292 N. Y. 724,55 N. E. (2d) 522 (1944).
1. "It shall be the duty of the Commission . . . to require . . . that each regstcred
[public utility] holding company, and each subsidiary company thereof, shall take such steps
as the Commission shall find necessary to ensure that the corporate structure or continued
existence . . . does not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure, or unfairly or
inequitably distribute voting power among security.holders, of such holding company
system." PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT § 11(b) (2), 49 S",T. 821 (1935), 15
U. S. C. § 79k(b) (2) (1940). Held constitutional in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
141 F. (2d) 606 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944); Central & South West Utilities Co. ,. SEC, 136 F. (2d)
273 (App. D. C. 1933); Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. SEC, 134 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A.
3d, 1943); In re Community Power & Light Co., 33 F. Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
2. These claims may be of various kinds. They may consist of oprn account indebtcd-
ness or dividend arrearages, or they may result from fraudulent transactions made by con-
trolling stockholders, such as loans at excessive interest rates, deflation of the market values
of subsidiary securities through improper control by the parent, or transfers of proparty
among various subsidiaries for insufficient consideration. Legally the claims rest in contract
or tort; and relief could be obtained only through resort to litigation. However, the Commis-
sion has considered their adjudication within its responsibilities in evolving a "fair and equi-
table" plan under Section 11(b) (2) or Section 11(e). See In the Matter of Ncw Engla d Gas
& Elect. Ass'n, SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4158, March 8, 1943; In the Matter of
North American Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4098, Feb. 5, 1943;
In the Matter of the North American Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4066, Jan. 23,
1943.
3. A remedy before an administrative body has been held to be a "plain, adequate,
and complete" remedy at law. Elliott v. El Paso Elect. Co., 38 F. (2d) 505, 506 (C. C. A. Sth,
1937). See also Pratt v. Oberman & Co., 89 F. (2d) 786, 787 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Precision
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the courts have reached the result desired by the SEC by granting stays to
litigation, 4 the use of a concurrent jurisdiction rationale has left the scope
of the Commission's authority subject to the vagaries of judicial discretion.
In the recent case of J. C. F. Holding Corporation v. General Gas & Electric
Corporation,5 however, a new theory supporting the primary jurisdiction of
the Commission and applicable to derivative suits was affirmed by the New
York state courts.
Minority stockholders of the General Gas & Electric Corporation brought
a derivative action against their company and other subsidiaries of the
Associated Gas holding company system, alleging as bad faith the failure of
directors of the Corporation to sue the other subsidiary companies on claims
arising out of certain fraudulent stock transfers consummated by a prior
management.6 The defendant General Gas moved to dismiss the action on
Castings Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 15, 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Royal Baking Powder Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm., 32 F. (2d) 966, 968 (App. D. C. 1929); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v.
Board of Public Works, 17 F. Supp. 170, 173 (N. D. W. Va. 1936); De Pauw Univ. v. Brunk,
53 F. (2d) 647,652 (W. D. Mo. 1931).
But the SEC abandoned this stand as well as the argument that it had "exclusive"
authority over intercorporate claims after an adverse result in Dederick v. North American
Co., 48 F. Supp. 410 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) (in which the court granted a stay of a derivative
action on the ground that relief in the Commission proceedings might cause abandonment of
the suik but denied the contention that Section 11(b) (2) conferred exclusive authority to
determine intercorporate claims upon the SEC).
4. In addition to Dederick v. North American .Co., 48 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
cited supra note 3, see Illinois Iowa Power Co. v. North American Light & Power Co., 49 F.
Supp. 277 (D. Del. 1943) (action for an accounting based on wrongs allegedly done the
plaintiff-company by its parent which was stayed by the court on the grounds of "economics
and comity") ind Palumbo v. Electric Bond & Share Co., 52 F. Supp. 93 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
In the latter case, in a derivative action based on alleged downstream loans at excessive
interest rates from parent to subsidiary, a stay was originally refused on the grounds (1) that
it was speculative whether the Commission would adjudicate the claims in its proceedings,
and (2) that the Commission could not adjudicate the liability of the noncorporate defend-
ants, namely, the directors of the defendant corporation. Upon motion of'the Commission
for rEargument and intervention, however, the court said that it had been "led into error,"
and granted the motion for a stay; no reasons were given for its reversal of position. Unre-
ported opinion of Judge Rifkind, Dec. 10, 1943.
Commission jurisdiction has also been directly attacked by an attempt to review an
order of the Commission asserting jurisdiction over unliquidated intra-system claims. In tho
Matter of New England Gas & Elect. Ass'n, SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4158, March 8,
1943. On April 20, 1943 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the petition
to review (order unreported) on the ground that the order was not final and therefore not re-
viewable.
5. J. C. F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas & Elect. Corp., 181 Misc. 283, 46 N. Y, S.
(2d) 605 (Sup. Ct. 1943), a.ff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 863, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 303 (1st Dep't
1944), motionfor leave to appealdenied, 292 N. Y. 724,55 N. E. (2d) 522 (1944).
6. The plaintiffs also alleged that the directors of General Gas were incapable of acting
in good faith because of dual capacity as trustees of the parent company and directors of
General Gas. The court, however, rejected that contention on the ground that mere exist-
ence of dual capacity did not invalidate the actions of the directors. J. C. F. Holding Corp.
v. General Gas & Elect. Corp., 181 Misc. 283, 289, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 605, 610-11 (Sup. Ct.
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the ground that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue because the directors had
acted in good faith 7 in pursuing the alternative course of submitting to the
Commission a plan of recapitalization which called for settlement of the
claims.$ The motion was granted by the court, which found that the "di-
rectors, in the exercise of their free and untrammeled judgment, had the
right to decide not to bring a suit . . . and to submit the matter to the
SEC." 9
Persuasive reasons for administrative rather than judicial adjudication of
intra-system claims support this decision. The prosecution of multiple and
independent actions would delay the preparation and completion of re-
capitalization plans until all claims between members of a public utility
holding company system had been pressed through the tedious course of
trial and appeal to a final determination. The Commission, on the other
hand, can treat the claims as components of one problem of recapitalization
and can settle them by one comprehensive plan of security transfers.' 0 Not
only are economies of time and effort thereby effected, but the competence of
an administrative body within its field may be expected to promote the
1943). See Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31
N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1st Dep't 1941); Goldstein v. Trans-Continental Corp., 282 N. Y. 21,
27, 24 N. E. (2d) 728, 730 (1940); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N. Y. 227, 236-7, 43 N. E. 2d,
18,22 (1942).
7. In order to maintain a derivative action, plaintiffs must show that the director-
acted in bad faith in refusing to institute suit on the claim which is the subject matter of the
litigation. See United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261
(1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 UL. S. 455 (1903); Hawes v. Oa:-
land, 104 U. S. 450 (1881); Koch v. Estes, 264 N. Y. 4S0, 191 N. E. 525 (1934); Flynn v.
Brooklyn City R. R., 158 N. Y. 493,53 N. E. 520 (1899); Watson v. Consolidated Laundries
Corp., 235 App. Div. 234, 256 N. Y. Supp. 891 (2d Dep't 1932); 13 FLETCnER, C mcLoPEDA
oF THE LAw oF PRIVATE CoaoA.TioNs (perm. ed. 1933) §§ 5969,5822.
S. Section 11(e) permits the voluntary filing with the Commission of a plan for the
purpose of enabling the company filing the plan or its subsidiaries to comply with the provi-
sions of Section 11(b) (2). 49 STAT. 822 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79k(e) (1940). These plans
frequently make proision for settlement of intra-system claims. See, for ezample, the plan
submitted by the United Gas Corporation discussed in In the Mailer of Uritcd Gas Cerp.,
SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5271, Sept. 7, 1944.
9. J. C. F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas & Elect. Corp., 181 Misc. 283,289,46 N. Y.
S. (2d) 605,611 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
10. Despite the broad provisions of the Federal Rules and some state rules of civil
practice on joinder of parties and joinder of causes of action, the courts are limited to con-
sideration of factual matters framed by the pleadings of the parties. This, however, is not
strictly true of derivative or other class actions in federal courts, for by the provisions of the
Federal Rules members of the class who may be inadequately represented are given the
right to appeal. See FED. RULES CIV. PROC., Rules 23(a), 24(a). The Commission, on the
other hand, may investigate all matters relating to the problem of recapitalization and
reorganization under the provisions of Section 11(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. See Illinois Iowa Power Co. v. North American Light & Power Co., 49 F. Supp. 277,
279 (D. Del. 1943) (in which the court points out that while the instant suit was merely
against the parent company of the plaintiff, the Commiion's proceedings "include all
parties with claims against the totality of assets").
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application of sound and consistent criteria to the technical matters involved
in intercorporate claims.,l
Previous judicial reluctance to concede primary jurisdiction to the SEC
has apparently been due to apprehensions that the Commission might not
decide the instant claims in its proceedings under Section 1I(b) (2),12 that it
might deny the plaintiff intervention, 3 or that the proceedings might be
abandoned altogether. 14 But failure of the SEC to adjudicate intra-system
claims is unlikely; the evaluation of corporate assets is an obviously essential
step in recapitalization, and, since corporate liabilities and assets include
claims against or in favor of the corporation, there can be no reallocation of
securities until the rank, validity and amount of these claims are adjudi-
cated. And the provisions in, the Act for review would seem an adequate
safeguard against arbitrary denials of intervention. 15
11. Furthermore, in preparing a "fair and equitable" plan of reorganization the SEC
may employ equitable principles as freely as the courts, See Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 89 (1942) (in which the court said that in evolving
standards of fairness and equity the SEC is not even bound by settled judicial precedents).
Subordination of parent company claims or of security holdings of parent companies in
subsidiary corporations has, for example, been recognized by the SEC as an appropriate
remedy for exploitation of subsidiaries by their parents. See the statement of the Commis-
sion concerning the bond financing of the United Gas Corporation in SEC Holding Co. Act
Release No. 3301, Jan. 31, 1942. This so-called Deep Rock doctrine was approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Company, 306 U. S. 307
(1939).
It is also at least arguable that in the interests of equity the Commission may substitute
the federal doctrine of laches for state statutes of limitation. The argument is bottomed on
'the Commission's standing as a body created by a federal statute and aided in its functions
by the federal courts. If state statutes of limitation are procedural, so that a federal court
need not be bound by them under the rule of Erie v. Tompkins, then the Commission should
not be bound; instead, as a federal body, it should employ the equitable federal doctrine of
laches. See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d 1944), cert. granted,
65 Sup. Ct. 60 (U. S. 1944).
12. In Palumbo v. Electric Bond & Share Co., discussed supra note 4, the court, in its
first opinion, said that the character of the Commission proceedings did not even warrant a
stay of the action because there was "merely a possibility" that the claims before the court
would be determined in the proceedings. 52 F. Supp. 93,95 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
13. See Dederick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp. 410, 412 (S. D. N. Y. 1943),
cited supra note 3.
14. Ibid.
15. Section 24(a) of the Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the
Commission may obtain review of that order, in the court of appeals for the circuit wherein
that person resides or has his principal place of business, by filing a petition for review
within 60 days after the entry of the order. 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79x (1940).
If the review is of a plan submitted under Section 11 (e), rather than a Section 11 (b) (2)
order, review is in a district court. Okn v. SEC, 145 F. (2d) 206 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). To
secure enforcement of its order approving such plan the Commission may apply, under Sec-
tion 18(f), 49 STAT. 832 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79r(f) (1940), to the district court, and a person
denied intervention by the Commission could be heard there. The Commission usually per-
mits interested security holders "leave to be heard in its proceedings." As a practical matter
"leave to be heard" is equivalent to intervention. It includes the privilege of introducing
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Not only are the apprehensions of the courts without substantial basis, but
continued reliance on the theory of concurrent jurisdiction might well
impede the administration of Section 11(b) (2). Under that doctrine the
discretion of the court is the only standard in staying litigation; and discre-
tion might be influenced by factors foreign to the issue of court versus com-
mission adjudication. For example, the joining of directors as defendants for
their complicity in transactions forming the basis of litigation might militate
against a stay because the Commission lacks authority to adjudicate the
liability of non-corporate defendants." Again, the very misgivings which
set the courts against the primary jurisdiction of the SEC might prompt
refusals to stay litigation. The possibility of such refusals is made doubly
unfortunate by the general principle that discretionary acts of a lower court
are notreviewable.1
7
When litigation on a claim is in the nature of a derivative action, 15 the
J. C. F. case provides a rationale for the primary jurisdiction of the SEC
which is less vulnerable than either the Commission's original theory of
exclusive jurisdiction or the argument that its proceedings are an adequate
remedy at law. By shifting the focus of arguments against litigation from
jurisdictional grounds to the plaintiff's lack of standing to sue, the desired
result of unimpeded administrative adjudication is achieved without seem-
ing to divest the courts of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Although it
might be argued that certain facts in the J. C. F. case,n which made litiga-
tion particularly inadvisable, might not be present in other cases, submission
of a voluntary plan of recapitalization to the Commission seems in any
event a reasonable alternative to litigation. As far as the court is concerned
such a plan is equivalent to an out-of-court settlement, which has always
been considered a course of action preferable to litigation in dealing with
evidence, cross-examining, and submitting briefs and oral arguments. See Rule XVII of
the Commission's RULES OF CiviL PRAcricE. Presumably the appeal provisions of Sec-
tion 24(a) are broad enough to protect persons accorded this right of limited participation.
16. No provision in the Act gives the Commission authority to adjudicate the tort
liability of individual defendants. See Palumbo v. Electric Bond & Share Co., 52 F. Supp.
93, 95 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
17. Clark v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 245 App. Div. 447, 283 N. Y. Supp. 739 (3d
Dep't 1935); Hogan v. Franken, 221 App. Div. 164, 223 N. Y. Supp. 1 (3d Dep't 1927);
McGurty v. Delaware, L. & V. R. R., 172 App. Div. 46, 158 N. Y. Supp. 2S5 (4th Dep't
1916).
18. See, e.g., Dederick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp. 410 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), cited
supra note 3, and Palumbo v. Electric Bond & Share Co., 52 F. Supp. 93 (S. D. N. Y. 1943),
discussed supra note 4.
19. In the J. C. F. case the defendants, in urging that submiEsion of a plan was a reason-
able course of action, pointed out that it was quite possible that the statute of limitations had
run upon the claims. See J. C. F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas & Elect. Corp., 46 N. Y.
(2d) 605, 608 (Sup. Ct. 1943). In addition the defendant General Gas submitted in its brief
that in order to establish any equity in the public common stockholders, whom the plaintiffs
represented, the recovery in the suit would have to be large enough to pay off substantial
dividend arrearages on the preferred stock.
1945]
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claims. And the advantages of an administrative remedy make the choice
by directors of Commission adjudication a valid act of discretion.
One emendation to the J. F. C. rationale should be made, however; in-
stead of contending that a plaintiff-stockholder "lacks capacity to sue," it
would be more accurate to argue that he is unable to state a derivative cause
of action.2 0 In a derivative suit legal capacity to sue refers to the propriety
of one's standing before a court as a representative of the party to whom the
right of action belongs,21 and this standing the plaintiff possesses as a stock-
holder in the company holding the claim. On the other hand, whether or
not the directors of the corporation acted in good faith and in a reasonable
exercise of their discretion in not suing on a claim is properly an element of
the derivative cause of iction.
22
The principle of the J. C. F. case can be applied only to derivative suits.2 3
20. In New York a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action may be made
under Rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Practice. Unfortunately affidavits in support of the
motion are not available under that Rule. Citizen's Trust Co. of Binghampton v. Marselis,
148 Misc. 676, 266 N. Y. Supp. 353 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 244 App. Div. 845, 279 N. Y. Supp.
324 (3d Dep't 1935); Levy v. Paramount Publix Corp., 149 Misc. 129, 266 N. Y. Supp. 271
(Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 711, 269 N. Y. Supp. 997 (1st Dep't 1934). Since the
defendants wished to use affidavits to demonstrate that the directors of General Gas pro-
posed to settle complaints of public investors in the SEC proceeding, they based their motion
to dismiss on Rule 107, which provides for supporting affidavits, but does not provide for a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Therefore use was made of the m otion
to dismiss for lack of capacity to sue. Although the dismissal of the case on this theory seems
legally incorrect, as a practical matter reliance upon it was successful.
21. "Capacity to sue" is the right to come into court and differs from a "cause of action"
which is a right to relief in the court. Howell v. Iola-Portland Cement Co., 86 Nan. 450,
452, 121 Pac. 346, 347 (1912). See also Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelist Ass'n, 239 App.
Div. 253, 267 N. Y. Supp. 719 (4th Dep't 1933) (in which a former voting trustee was held
to have capacity to sue for a declaration of the validity of the voting trust because he re-
tained a beneficial interest in the stock); Mulligan v. Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 193
App. Div. 741, 184 N. Y. Supp. 429 (1st Dep't 1920).
22. In order to state a derivative cause of action in New York the complaint "must
allege facts from which may be inferred: (1) The existence of a cause of action in favor of
the corporation; (2) The refusal of the board of directors to sue, or that demand on the
board to sue would be unavailing; (3) That the refusal to sue is due (a) to fraud, bad faith,
or misconduct on the part of the board amounting to a breach of trust; or (b) to inexcusable
neglect on the part of the board, or indifference to the welfare of the corporation; or (c) that
the board in refusing to sue, was subjected to improper control or was otherwise not in a
position to exercise fair, honest, and independent judgment. . . . To put it as simply as
possible, it must appear from the allegations of the complaint that in refusing to institute the
action the board of directors were not acting in good faith as honest, diligent directors should
act." Koch v. Estes, 146 Misc. 249, 252-3, 262 N. Y. Supp. 23, 27 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 240
App. Div. 829, 266 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (Ist Dop't 1933). Although this was quoted with ap-
proval in the J. C. F. case, the court implied that the rule demonstrated the plaintiff's lack of
capacity to sue rather than the insufficiency of the complaint in stating a cause of action.
See also 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (repl. vol. 1943)
§ 5822.
23. The rule of the J. C. F. case may also be restricted to derivative suits instituted
after the submission of a plan to the Commission. Where the derivative suit has been in-
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When the corporation itself brings an action on an intercorporate claim, the
most effective rationale available to the Commission would probably be the
necessity for exhausting administrative remedies before resort to a court.2 4
Although as a practical matter the existence of a special statutory system of
relief for the resolution of complicated technical problems is the strongest
reason for avoiding judicial adjudication of intercorporate claims, the useful-
ness of this exhaustion doctrine has not yet been explored."0 Like the J. C. F.
rationale, it avoids the pitfalls of a more frankly jurisdictional argument;
in particular it seems not to usurp the functions of the courts but merely to
set a condition precedent to litigation. The net result is the same: the as-
surance of unimpeded Commission adjudication of intercorporate claims in
the administration of Section 1 (b) (2).
CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY UNDER NATIONAL SERVICE LIFE
INSURANCE*
THE National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 1 provides that an in-
stituted prior to submission of a voluntary plan, the Commission can apply to a district
court for enforcement of the plan. If the plan were approved the court could then enjoin
the pending derivative action. In the Malter of t1e Applicalion of the SEC to Enforce Com-
pliance with Orders Issued under Section 11(b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935
with respect to the Columvbia Oil and Gas Corp., Civil Action 280 (D. Del. 1942). See also
N. Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1942, p. 45, col. 4; N. Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1942, p. 35, col. 7.
24. Although the exhaustion doctrine was originally confined to suits in equity it has
been extended to suits at law. See Anniston IMfg. Co. v. Dqvis, 301 U. S. 337, 343 (1937);
First Nat. Bank v. Weld County, 264 U. S. 450, 455 (1924). See also Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41,51, n. 9 (1938).
25. The jurisdiction of the SEC over intercorporate claims might have been, and might
still be, clearly established by inserting in the Public Utility Holding Company Act a provi-
sion on jurisdiction over corporate assets similar to the provision in § 77 of the NATo.zAL
BANRupTcy AcT. 52 STAT. 884 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 511 (1940). § 77(a) provides that as
soon as the petition for reorganization is approved, the court shall "have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the debtor [railroad] and its property wherever located." The Interstate Commerce
Commission may then adjudicate claims against the debtor ith the full assurance that it,
through the bankruptcy court, has sufficient and exclusive jurisdiction. As it stands, the
Public Utility Holding Company Act provides only that the SEC may apply to a federal
district court to take jurisdiction of holding company assets to enforce an order or plan
already prepared, leaving the holding company assets readily assailable during the pariod
when reorganization is being planned. If the Act provided that the Commission should file a
petition with the proper federal district court immediately upon institution of Section 11(b)
(2) proceedings, and that the court, upon approving the petition, should take excluslve
jurisdiction of holding company assets, the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction to ad-
judicate intercorporate claims would in large measure be solved.
* Bradley v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944).
1. 54 STAT. 1008 (1940), 38 U. S. C. § 801 (1940). See Note (1940) 147 A. L. R. 1187.
All personnel on active duty in the land and naval forces on or after October 8, 1940, includ-
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sured shall have the right to change his beneficiary at all times 2 "subject to
regulations" to be made by the Administrator of the Veterans' Administra-
tion.3 But it is also provided that "in the event of a disagreement as to a
claim" 4 suit may be brought in a federal court.5 Thus the statute seems to
give the Administrator broad discretion in his treatment of attempted
changes of beneficiary on the one hand while limiting his discretion by judi-
cial review on the other. These somewhat conflicting policies of the Act
have led a Circuit Court of Appeals to what seems an unfortunate decision
in the recent case of Bradley v. United States.6
Upon induction into the army the insured designated his mother as
beneficiary of his life insurance, but after his subsequent marriage he de-
livered his policy to his wife,7 named his wife as beneficiary in a required
ing the Coast Guard, may take out War Risk Insurance. For a general outline of a policy
see the pamphlet NATIONAL SERVIcE LIFE INSURANCE (Veterans' Administration, 1944).
The Government also offers United States Government Life (Converted) Insurance
policies to veterans of the first World War, including those now in the service, 45 STAT. 970
(1928), 38 U. S. C. § 512a (1940), and undertakes to guarantee to commercial insurance com-
panies the premiums on their insurance carried by persons in active pervice.
See also Notes (1928) 55 A. L. R. 587; (1931) 73 A. L. R. 327; (1932) 81 A. L. R. 937.
These notes treat the cases which arose under the 1917 Act (see note 22 infra). The present
Act is fairly similar, however, and the principles laid down in the earlier decisions are largely
pertinent and applicable.
2. Section 602g [54 STAT. 1010 (1940), 38 U.S. C. § 802 (1940) ] provides that "insured
shall . . . at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries without the
consent of such beneficiary, or beneficiaries."
3. "The Administrator, subject to the general direction of the President, shall ad-
minister, execute and enforce the provisions of this part, shall have power to make such ruler
and regulations . . . as are necessary or appropriate to carry out its purposes, and shall
decide all questions arising hereunder." 54 STAT. 1012 (1940), 38 U. S. C. § 808 (1940).
4. 54 STAT. 1014 (1940), 38 U.S. C. § 817 (1940).
5. Ibid. This section provides that Section 19 of the Act covering United States Gov-
ernment Life (Converted) Insurance, 43 STAT. 612 (1924), 38 U. S. C. § 445 (1940), governs
the commencement of suits. An action may be brought by a blaimant in the District Court
of the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United States of the distrift wherein
the claimant resides. The procedure to be used is the one outlined in 24 STAT. 506 (1887),
28 U. S. C. § 762-73 (1940); 24 STAT. 507 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 765 (1940). "An Act to pro-
vide for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States." All who claim
an interest in the insurance may be made parties and those who are not inhabitants of the
district where the suit is brought may be made to appear by court order. A bill of inter-
pleader may also be brought by the Administrator in the name of the United States in
instances where the indebtedness of the Administration is granted but there are conflicting
claims.
Appeals may be made to the Circuit Courts of Appeals and Court of Appeals for the-
District of Columbia. Subject to the standard exceptions of 36 STAT. 1157 (1911), 28 U. S. C.
§§ 346-347 (1940), the decrees of these latter courts are final.
6. 143 F. (2d) 573 (C. C.A. 10th, 1944).
7. Only the dissenting opinion mentions this fact. It is evidently derived from line 7
of the questionnaire (see note 8 infra), where insured stated that his "policies, will or other-




con fidential report to the War Department,' and thereafter told his vife that
"he had taken care of" the insurance Subsequent to the insured's death,
which occurred on the day following the execution of his report, both his
wife and his mother filed claims as beneficiaries of decedent's policy,' 0 and
thereupon the Veterans' Administration requested and received the insured's
confidential report to the War Department. Waiving compliance vith the
regulation that a change of beneficiary is to be effected by written notice
"forwarded to the Veterans' Administration by the insured," " the Adminis-
tration determined that a valid change of beneficiary from mother to vife
had been made. The mother's challenge of this determination proved un-
successful in the district court,'2 but a majority of the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that no valid change of beneficiary had been effected.'
3
The court's decision is predicated on two rules of ordinary insurance law-
which heretofore were applied only casually, if at all, to National Service
insurance. 14 The more important of these 13 asserts that although strict
8. This was a "confidential personal report" which all flying officcrs were ordered to
fill out in order to furnish the War Department w ith accurate personal records of each officcr.
It was executed at the Army Air Base, Windsor Locks, Connecticut, and filed at the head-
quarters of insured's pursuit group. The report stated insured's name, rank, branch of
service, address, and ife's name. It included also the type of insurance carried, the location
of insured's important papers, and in the blank provided for filling in "Beneficiary," the
name of his wife. Bradley v. United States, cited supra note 6, at 574.
9. Bradley v. United States, cited supra note 6, at 574. Evidence was also offered to
show that previous to the filling out of the report, insured had mentioned to his wife on
several occasions the fact that h6 was going to make her the beneficiary and that he had
discussed means of doing so with his comrades.
The phrase "had taken care of" signifies more than mere intent to do something in the
future and may be interpreted as evidence that the soldier had already done everything
reasonably within his power.
10. Upon receipt of the report, the Administration informed the mother that her son
had stipulated his wife as beneficiary on the questionnaire, and that if Ehe wLzhed, .he might
file a claim. The wife v.was informed that the Administration, upon a "thorough inve-tiga-
tion," had determined that a valid change had taken place but that the mother had been
given thirty days in which to bring suit. Bradley v. United States, cited supra note 6, at 575.
11. Regulation R. and P. R-3447 provides that ".... a change of beneficiary to be
effective must be made by notice in writing signed by the insured, and forwarded to the
Veterans' Administration by the insured or his agent, and must contain sufficient informa-
tion to identify the insured. Whenever practical each notice shall be given on blanks pre-
scribed by the Veterans' Administration. Upon receipt by the Veterans' Administration, a
valid designation or change of beneficiary shall be deemed to be effective as of the date of
execution." Bradley v. United States, cited supra note 6, at 576.
Under the act in effect during the first World ar, 38 STAT. 711 (1914), at least one
witness to the writing was required. Regulation 14 of March 20, 1918, issued pursuant to
authority granted in Sections 13 and 403 of the act."
12. Bradley v. United States, E. D. Okla., July 10, 1943.
13. But see the able dissent of Judge Phillips. Bradley v. United States cited supra
note d, at 578.
14. See Bradley v. United States, cited supra note 6, at 576-7. It is generallyheld that a
war risk insurance policy is a contract completely statutory in basis, and that the rights and
duties of the parties stem not from the rules which govern private life insurance, but from
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compliance with regulations is not necessary to perfect a change of bene-
ficiary when the intent to change is clear, the insured must have ddne
the statutes and regulations passed expressly for war risk insurance. Brown v. United States,
65 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Boulger v. United States, 60 F. (2d) 560 (D. Mass. 1932);
Maulis v. United States, 56 F. (2d) 444 (N. D. 111. 1931); Sternfeld v. United States, 32 F.
(2d) 789 (N. D. N. Y. 1929); Mack v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928);
Tomlinson v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 795 (D. Mont. 1926); Bean v. United States, 7 F.
(2d) 393 (D. Kan. 1925); Birmingham v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925);
Eblen v. Jordan, 33 S. W. (2d) 65 (1930); Note (1943) 19 NOTRE D E LAWYER 191, 28
AMER. JUR. 1550; APPLEMAN, INsuRANcE LAW AND PRACTICE (1941); cf. Coleman v. United
States 18 F. Supp. 71 (W. D. Tenn. 1937), aff'd, 100 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), rev'd,
266 U. S. 594 (1925). But see Mikell v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933)
(principles of ordinary insurance should govern); Eggen v. United States, 58 F. (2d) 616
(C. C. A. 8th, 1932); United States v. Martin, 54 F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Jensen v.
United States, 29 F. (2d) 951 (D. Ore. 1929); State Bank v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 439
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926). Consequently, Congressional legislation and administrative regula-
tions promulgated subsequent to the issuance of a policy have the effect of placing new
terms and provisions in the contract--i.e., they are retroactive in effect. White v. United
States 270 U. S. 175 (1926); Singleton v. Cheek, 284 U. S. 493 (1932); United States v.
Carlson, 44 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); Eblen v. Jordan, supra. Generally used as the
basis of distinction between the two types of insurance is the fact that a war risk policy does
not have commercial gain as the raison d'9tre but is often considered as something in the
nature of a gratuity. "The insurance was a contract, to be sure, for which a premium was
paid, but it was not one entered into by the United States for gain. All soldiers were given a
right to it and the relation of the Government to them if not paternal was at least avuncular.
It was a relation of benevolence established by the Government at considerable cost to itself
for the soldier's good." Mr. Justice Holmes in White v. United States, supra at 180, See
also Birmingham v. United States, supra; United States v. Lyke, 19 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A.
9th, 1927); VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 938. Cf. United States v. McPhee 31 F. (2d)
243 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); Eggen v. United States, supra.
Whether or not strict compliance with regulations will be demanded depends in good
measure on the "nature of the right taken by the designated beneficiary. ... " If the
beneficiary is held by the courts to have a vested interest and the interest of the insured to
be a "mere power enabling him by its exercise to defeat an existing vested interest of the
beneficiary" strict compliance will be held necessary before the beneficiary is divested. If,
however, the beneficiary's interest is a "vague expectancy," courts will be more disposed to
honor an adequate showing of intent on the part of the insured. See VANICE, suepra, at 560
et seg. In war risk insurance, it is settled that the interest of the beneficiary is a mere ex-
pectancy and he is consequently more easily divested. See White v. United States, supra;
Helmholz v. Horst, 294 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). But see Gifford v. United States, 289
Fed. 833 (D. N. J. 1921).
In the principal case (at 576-7) the court cites as its authorities decisions, treatises, and
articles all of which deal with ordinary or old-line insurance. The great difference between
old-line and war risk insurance is graphically illustrated by the following discussion taken
from one of the court's authorities, which treats the difference between old-line and fraternal
orders' insurance, the latter type standinj midway between old-line and war risk insurance.
It constitutes, of course an a forliori argument concerning the variance of the two latter
types. "A distinction is recognized between old line insurance which is on a strictly conimer-
cial basis, and the insurance furnished by fraternal orders or societies ...since one of the
main purposes of a fraternal order insuring its members is to provide for the dependents of
the insured pursuant to the ideals and instruction of the order, the matter of giving consent
to a change of beneficiary involhres the exercise of discretion on the part of the officers of the
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"everything reasonably within his power" IG to accomplish his purpose if
equity is to heed it. Elaborating this rule, the majority in the Bradley case
concluded that intent to change, though indisputably established, does not
permit the supplanting of the original beneficiary "when unaccompanied by
some affirmative act." 17
The doctrine thus laid down appears to conflict with the great majority of
war risk insurance cases which allowed reform of the policy upon proof of
intent alone.'8 Such proof is necessarily supplied by evidence of acts, but
society in order that the purposes of the organization may be fulfilled. Such concidera-
tions . . . do not exist with reference to insurance on a strictly commercial basis." Note
(1932) 78 A. L. R. 970.
15. Vance sums up the rules governing the change of beneficiary in ordinary life insur-
ance as follows: A demonstration of clear intent to make the change is not sufficient if any
of the formal requirements have not been complied with, except in the following instances:
(1) When insurer has waived any merely formal defects in an attempted change. (2) When
insured has done all in his power to comply with the requirements but did not surrender his
policy because it was not within his control. (3) If insured did all required, but dies before
the new certificate is issued, or some other purely ministerial act to be done by the insurer
was not performed. "In all jurisdictions it seems to be held, by analogy ith the familiar
rule in the law of powers, that equity will aid a defective execution of a power where the
defect is merely formal; that when the insured with the clear intent to change the bene-
ficiary does everything in his power to effect a change the mere fact that he [cannot comply
with a minor procedural requirement] . . . or . . . any other reason . . . beyond the
insured's control, will not render the change invalid." VANcE, INsonxcE (2d ed. 1930)
569-73, citing Royal Arcanum v. Behrend, 247 U. S. 394 (1918).
16. This rule has occasionally been followed in war risk cases. "Mere intention . . . is
not sufficient but here this intention was followed by acts through which he attempted to
accomplish this change . . . he did everything he might reasonably have been expected to
do, under the circumstances, to effectuate such change." Johnson v. White, 39 F. (2d) 793
(C. C. A. 8th, 1930) (insured had named his sister as original beneficiary but after his mar-
riage wrote his wife saying that he would make her the new beneficiary. He had in addition
inquired at company headquarters concerning a change and made various oral statements
indicating such an intent). See also Kaschefsky v. Kaschefsky, 110 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 6th,
1940); Farley v. United States, 291 Fed. 238 (D. Ore. 1923).
17. Bradley v. United States, cited stpra note 6, at 576.
18. ".... form, formality, and legal technicality must give way to common sence and
remedial justice, when all doubt is removed as to the intent of the deceased soldier; and when
the purpose of the law has been complied with, there should be no hesitancy in carrying out
the expressed wish of such deceased. . . . All that is necessary is that the real wish and
purpose of the soldier, who exposed his life in the army for the safety of the government,
should sufficiently appear. . . ." Claffy v. Forbes, 280 Fed. 233, 235 (%V. D. Wash. 1922), a
leading case. For other typical statements see Ambrose v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 52, 53
V. D. N. Y. 1926): "Does his failure to understand the requirements defeat his established
intention. . . . In matters of the kind under consideration, the soldier's real purpose and
wish should control," and United States v. Tuebert, 57 F. (2d) 895, 896 (E. D. N. Y. 1932):
"The real intent of the soldier should govern. His intention was clear that he wanted his
wife to receive the proceeds of the policy. His intention is controlling and is binding." See
also Steele v. Suwalski, 75 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); Heinemann v. Heinemann, 50 F.
(2d) 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Cady v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 263 (V. D. Wash. 1933);
Duncan v. Linton, 38 Ohio App. 57, 175 N. E. 621 (1929); United States v. Johnson, 46 F.
(2d) 549 (V. D. Ky. 1931). "
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even expression of intent in letter6 addressed to the new beneficiary,19 a step
far more equivocal 20 than the filing of a confidential report, has been held
sufficient to justify reformation of the policy. It is true that in a number of
cases 21 intent as expressed in such letters was given effect to under the regu-
lations of the 1917 Act 22 which unlike the regulations under discussion per-
mitted designation of a beneficiary by last will and testament. But the
obvious distinction on that ground is difficult to make, for letters which
concededly could not be probated as wills, 23 and in at least one case a letter
19. See Steele v. Suwalski, 75 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), where a letter written by
insured to,his sister-in-law expressing the wish that she be a co-beneficiary and residuary
beneficiary of a government insurance policy of which his father was the beneficiary was
held sufficient; Ambrose v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 52 (W. D. N. Y. 1926), where a letter
written to several brothers and sisters of insured saying that, although one of the sisters was
named beneficiary they were all to share equally, was likewise upheld; and Morgan v.
United States, 13 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), where a letter written by a soldier to his
foster parents saying that they were the new beneficiaries was held ample proof.
For instances where letters to persons other than the new beneficiary have been deemed
to change the policy see Duncan v. Linton, 38 Ohio App. 57, 175 N. E. 621 (1929); Claffy v.
Forbes, 280 Fed. 233 (W. D. Wash. 1922); Cady v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 263 (W. D.
Wash. 1933). *
20. It should be borne in mind that while for various motives the writer of a personal
letter may be likely to make insincere promises, he will have no reason to state anything but
the truth in a document which is to be confidential. Compare Dean Gulliver's remarks con-
cerning "casual, off-hand statements" in letters, in Gulliver, Classification of Gratuilous
Transfers (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 1.
21. United States v. Napoleon, 296 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924); State Bank v. United
States, 16 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Reivick v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 670 (C. C, A,
6th, 1928).
22. The War Risk Insurance Act of 1917, 38 STAT. 711 (1914) as amended, October
1917, to provide for life insurance, 40 STAT. 398 (1917), and supplanted in 1924 by the World
War Veterans' Act, 43 STAT. 607 (1924), 38 U. S. C. § 421 (1940). In 1933, all laws on this
subject were repealed. 48 STAT. 11 (1933), 38 U. S. C. § 717 (1940).
The Act of 1917 resembles the present one in many fundamental features, There are
several differences, however; the former act provided for payment in case of complete dis-
ability as well as in case of death, 40 STAT. 409 (1917), while the later act is limited to life
insurance. Also, the proceeds of the older type of policy could be made payable to the estate
of the insured, with subsequent designation of beneficiary allowed in the will, whereas under
the 1940 only a limited class of persons, a widow, widower, child (including step-children and
illegitimate children), parent or one in loco parentis, brother, or sister of the insured, can
become beneficiaries. See Gregg v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); United
States v. Napoleon, 296 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924); State Bank v. United States, 16 F.
(2d) 439 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Reivick v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928),
See also Note, 26 IowA L. REv. 853 (1941).
23. Schroeder v.. United States, 24 F. (2d) 420 (S. D. Ohio, 1928); Helmholz v, Horst,
294 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). In discussing an admittedly invalid will, the court said:
"However that may be, it is, and was intended by the insured to be, a designation in writ-
ig of his aunt . . . as the beneficiary. .. . As such paper writing it was properly admitted
in evidence, although not a will, and not admitted to probate." Id. at 421. Quacrc---If the
orthodox old-line insurance rule were applied to the Helmholz case would not the facts of the
case (insured had done all he could) still serve to show a valid change of beneficiary?
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which admittedly wras not even intended as a will,2 4 were ingeniously con-
-strued as wills by the courts.25 In addition the incidental naming of a person
other than the original beneficiary in communications to the Veterans'
Administration concerning subjects unrelated to insurance, an act analogous
to the rendering of the report in the Bradley caEe,2 was held an effective
change of beneficiary.Y
24. Morgan v. United States, 13 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 4th, 19 2(1). In justifying the
acceptance of a letter as a will, the court said: "In nearly every American state the right is
preserved to soldiers and sailors . . . to make nuncupative wills, and the tendency of the
courts, particularly since the World War, has been altogether to treat soldiers and seamen
in such matters with peculiar indulgence. Where there is a writing, it is usually sufficient if it
shows a testaientary intent and expresses the desire of the soldier or sailor as to the disposi-
tion of his property after death. ... . In this case, the letter admittedly being genuine, we
are of opinion that the court below erred in rejecting it as insufficient under the provisions of
the act providing that a change of beneficiary may be made by last vill and testament, and
this, too, notwithstanding no effort was ever made to have it admitted to probate as his
last will." Id. at 764-5.
25. This is by no means the only situation in which courts have shown ingenuity in
matters of definition for the sake of protecting a favorite group. E.g., a child ct restre a whe
is often considered as born, living, or surviving. See the cases collected in Note (1935p 33
MicH. L. REv. 414, 415. "The desire to protect and safeguard the interests of these 'pets of
the court' [children] has sometimes been carried to the point of doing violence to the ordinary
meaning of words. . . ." Id. at 415. Cf. also Note (1936) 52 L. Q. Ruv. 1.
26. Although these illustrations, see note 27 infra, may be distinguished from the
principal case in that the communications were addressed to the Veterans' Administration,
albeit to another division of it, they are functionally analogous to the Bradley case. The
application forms on which these communications were made were not requests for change
per se. They were directed to divisions of the Administration which, in view of its size, are
probably as distinct from one another as the Veterans' Administration is from the War De-
partment, to which the report in the principal case was sent. An outline of the Administra-
tion's duties and their scope will indicate its mammoth proportions. An independent agency
since 1930, it handles all matters concerning veterans of all wars and their dependents. Its
duties consist of the maintenance of hospitals and veterans' homes and the administration of
laws relating to veterans, including the following: pensions and compensation for disabilities
due to service, benefits to peace-time veterans, emergency officers' retirement pay, p2nslons
for total disability not due to the service, insurance, hospital care, pensions or compensation
to deceased veterans' dependents, bonus (adjusted compensation) and burial expenses of
veterans. As of 1940, the Administration was spending S600,000,O00 a year, handling more
than one hundred thousand claims in a similar period. It had, in 1938, over 36,000 em-
ployees, besides those on a per diem and per hour basis. REOIT OF "THE UNITED STATES
ATroRNEY GEN-Ei.u%'s COMMITTEE ON ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1940) 3-7.
There is an additional basis for the analogy. The United States may be considered a
legal unit. It max, in the abstract be a party to a suit, for example, and it could be argued,
therefore, that as notice to one division of a governmental agency has been accepted as
notice to another, see note 27 infra, so notice of change to one department of the Federal
Government, which is also a unit, is notice to another. The Veterans' Administration vas
evidently under this impression, for after the death of insured it requested the "confidential
personal report" which had been on file at the Headquarters of decedent's Pursuit Group
and, upon receipt, instituted the investigation which resulted in the award of the proceeds
of the policy to the wife.
The question whether the United States Government is a single unit was raked in
Defense Supplies Corp. v. United States Lines Company and United States of America,
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The few soldiers' insurance cases applying the "affirmative act" rule of
ordinary insurance law do not seem to have treated the rule as analytically
distinct from the general requirement that the insured's intent to change a
beneficiary must be ascertained. 28 They seem rather to have wisely con-
strued it as a rule of evidence 29 which furnishes a convenient rationale for
the dismissal of petitions to reform when the required evidence of intent is
unconvincing. Indeed, the only two decisions which employed the rule in
order to defeat intent can be explained by the intercession of the well-
established public policy of upholding the conjugal duty to support a spouse
in one case 30 and in another by circumstances which assimilated the case at
bar to ordinary insurance situations.3 1 In sacrificing both intent and the
public policy of protecting a spouse to the precepts of old-line insurance law
the principal case is probably unique.
C. C. A. 2d, March 28, 1945, where a government corporation sought to bring suit against
the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. The court, however, avoided the con-
stitutional and jurisprudential problem by construing the statute as forbidding such a suit.
But see Note (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 579, 583, n. 21, in which we argued that government de-
partments should be treated as functionally distinct units in a clearly distinguishable situa-
tion.
27. See United States v. Tuebert, 57 F. (2d) 895 (E. D. N. Y. 1932) and United States
v. Johnson, 46 F. (2d) 549 (W. D. Ky. 1931) (application for compensation and vocational
training); Heinemann v. Heinemann, 50 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931) (application for
conversion).
28. See Kaschefsky v. Kaschefsky, 110 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Johnson v.
White, 39 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); Peart v. Chaze, 13 F. (2d) 908 (W. D. La. 1926);
Farley v. United States, 291 Fed. 238 (W. D. Wash. 1923).
29. Compare the analogous treatment of the requirement of delivery in gift cases dis-
cussed in Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments (1926) 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 607. The most pertinent
cases are collected in n. 325, id. at 608.
30. Gifford v. United States, 289 Fed. 833 (N. J. 1921). This public policy is in har-
mony with many statements in the legal literature. See, e.g., SERvixcEIN's DrPENDNNTS
ALLOWANCE AcT § 104 which provides for the payment of a family allowance to a wife (in-
volving a deduction from the soldier's pay) upon her application (i.e., even though the soldier
is unwilling). 56 STAT. 381 (1942), 37 U. S. C. § 204 (Supp. 1944).
The application of this policy of protecting the wife would have been particularly de-
sirable in the principal case in view of the fact that insured's wife was pregnant at the time lie
attempted the change of beneficiary.
31. In Leahy v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), insured was a lawyer,
and the further fact that he had made the attempt at change after he left the service seems
a fortiori to place the case in a different category, where the policy considerations which
usually govern war risk insurance do not apply.
The three additional cases cited by the court in support of the affirmative acts rule
seem clearly distinguishable from the situation in the principal case. In Chichiarelli v.
United States, 26 F. (2d) 484 (D. Colo. 1928), insured had in a previous instance complied
with regulations, while in Kingston v. Hines, 13 F. (2d) 406 (W. D. Mich. 1926), there was no
waiver by the Bureau. In Layne v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925), there
was virtually a complete lack of evidence to prove intent.
For some special instances see Calhoun v. Ussery, 46 F. (2d) 495 (W. D. La. 1930), and
Elliott v. United States, 271 Fed. 1001 (W. D. Ohio 1920).
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The second proposition relied on by the majority opinion in the Bradley
case is a novel modification of the well-settled doctrine that the procedural
requirements for a change of beneficiary "are for the benefit of the insurer
and may be 'waived by him at his option," an originally narrow doctrine 3 2
which has been "expanded to the limit of its logic" in war risk insurance
cases. 33 The court recognized that the Administrator may waive technical
requirements, but added without citation of direct authority that he "may
not thereby adjudicate the question whether a valid change of beneficiary
has been effected in accordance with the prescribed means and method v.hich
is the legal standard for that purpose." This statement may be construed to
mean that the courts are not bound by an award of the Administrator which
could not have been made without waiving the regulations, and so con-
strued 34 it cannot be questioned. Yet the existence of this power of judicial
review does not always vindicate its exercise.13
32. According to Vance "the procedural requirements, such as the consent of the in-
surer and the indorsement thereof on the policy, are for the benefit of the insurer and may be
waived at his option." VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 571. "But such action on the part
of the insurer does not operate to waive any substantial requirements of the policy, or the by-
laws of the insurer, so as to affect the rights of either of the contesting claimants." Id. at
571-2, n. 25. He goes on to say that in old-line insurance, where there is a contest con-
cerning the beneficiary "it has frequently been held that it is not competent for the insurer
by waiving the procedural requirements to defeat the claim of the designated beneficiary
in favor ofthesubstitute." Id. at 572.
33. James v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Johnson v. White, 39 F.
(2d) 793 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); Chichiarelli v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 484 (D. Colo. 1928);
Peart v. Chaze, 13 F. (2d) 908 (W. D. La. 1926); Farley v. United States, 291 Fed. 233
(TV. D. Wash. 1923); 29 AmER. JUR. 1552. Compare Birmingham v. United States, 4 F. (2d)
508 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) (unauthorized waiver by employee does not bind the government)
and Brett v. Warrick, 44 Ore. 511 (1904) (ordinary insurance). The court in the principal
case cited several old-line insurance cases to buttress its narrow construction of a waiver.
Bradley v. United States, cited supra note 6, at 577. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Jones, 307 111. App. 653, 30 N. E. (2d) 937 (1940); Parks' Executors v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435,
156 S. IV. (2d) 480 (1941). But a survey of war risk insurance cases reveals no consideration
of waivers in like terms, except in Gifford v. United States, 289 Fed. 833 (D. N. J. 1921).
34. The opinion of the court in the principal case that the waiver exercised by the
Administration was adjudicatory might be given an alternate construction. If it be as-rned
that the beneficiary has a vested interest, see note 14 supra, then a waiver might have such
an effect, for in old-line insurance, the rights of the parties are usually considered fixed upon
the death of the insured and cannot thereafter be impaired by the insurer. This was the
doctrine of the Gifford case, 289 Fed. 833 (D. N. J. 1921). But since in war risk insurance the
rights of the parties are less definite but depend on the statutes and regulations in force or
afterwards adopted, see note 14 supra, such a consideration is practically meaningless for
this type of insurance. Of course, the administrator may not waive any regulations on which
the insured has relied, in such a way as to defeat his intent.
35. Except for reasons of exceptional moment, the reversal of decisions of both a trial
court and the Administrator may be undesirable. In view of the tremendous number of
policies that have been issued, any judicial encouragement of litigation may well swamp the
dockets of federal courts in the post war period.
The potential magnitude of the problem can be seen from the fact that the total number
of applications for insurance approved to June 30, 1943, was 9,565,088, amounting to
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A learned commentator has asserted 36 that, under a legal system recog-
nizing the individualistic institution of private property, it should be the
general philosophy of the courts to give effect to an intentional exercise of
the power to make a gratuitous transfer. Even in controversies growing out
of civilian life conspicuous intent should not be frustrated by an "inordinate
preoccupation with detail or dialectic." 11 A soldier in time of war enjoys
neither the leisure necessary to master procedural niceties, nor the civilian's
opportunities to consult learned counsel.38 His intent should command
especial protection.39
$66,506,754,500. As of the same date, benefits awarded in 16,172 cases totalled $105,613,800.
For a detailed study see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS
(1943).
The question of the costs involved should also be noted. By resorting to the courts it
cost the beneficiary in the principal case some $850 in attorneys' fees, which amount was
paid out of the insurance benefits. This amount was expended to get an adjudication which
would have cost nothing if the Veterans' Administration had been allowed to make it.
Determinations of the Veterans' Administration in other fields are often deemed final.
This applies to certain situations in the insurance division as well. See citations collected in
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE (1940) 11, n. 11.
36. Gulliver, supra note 20, at 2.
37. Ibid.
38. The courts have frequently recognized the difficulties which are likely to beset a
soldier in his attempts to comply with legal requirements. "The general danger to which all
soldiers are exposed . . . the chances of being suddenly posted elsewhere without good
opportunity to arrange one's affairs, not to add other reasons, such as the inconvenience of
procuring writing materials in camp suitable for solemn documents, the absence of legal
advisers, and the unskillfulness and illiteracy often found among military comrades. .. ."
1 SCOULER, LAW OF WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (6th ed. 1923) § 439 n,
quoted in Morgan v. United States, 13 F. (2d) 763, 765 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926). See also the
testimony cited in Johnson v. White, 39 F. (2d) 793, 795 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930):".. we were
transferred like a bunch of sheep and did not know where we were. . . . Soldiers were trans-
ferred from one company to another in such manner that you couldn't tell today what outfit
you was going to belong to . . . ."; and the language of the court in Claffy v. Forbes, 280
Fed. 233, 235 (W. D. Wash. 1922): "Throughout the history of the civilized world, since the
decrees of Julius Caesar, the intention and wish of the soldier, with relation to designation of
beneficiary or disposition of property, killed in the line of duty, has been carried out when
ascertained, whether it was scrawled in the sand with the point of his sword, or written on
the scabbard of his sword or his shield (The Customs of Duchy of Burgundy, printed at
Dijon, 1694, p. 410; Coutumes de Paris, column 51, Paris, 1714)."
39. See Boyett v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); United States v.
LePage, 59 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932); United States v. Lesher, 59 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A.
9th, 1932); United States v. Perry, 55 F. (2d) 819 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); McNally v. United
States, 52 F. (2d1) 440 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Sorvik v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931); Wojciechowski v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 385 (W. D. N. Y. 1931); Nicolay v.
United States, 51 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Glazow v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 178
(C. C. A. 2d, 1931); United States v. Mallery, 48 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Quirk v.
United States, 45 F. (2d) 631 (W. D. Pa. 1930); Ford v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 754 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1930); United States v. Worley, 42 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. Sth, 1930).
In their article, cited supra note 20, Dean Gulliver and Mrs. Tilson set out a functional
analysis of transfer requirements with the suggestion that the legal requirements of execu-
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IMPLIED CONSENT TO SUMMARY JURISDICTION IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS*
ALTHOUGH claimants to property involved in bankruptcy proceedings are
ordinarily entitled to a plenary suit in a state or federal forum in accordance
with Section 23 of the Chandler Act,' their rights may be adjudicated sum-
marily in four classes of situations: (1) in certain instances prescribed by
statute; 2 (2) when the bankruptcy court has actual or constructive posses-
sion of the property; 3 (3) when a person asserting a merely colorable claim
has actual or constructive possession of the property; 4 or (4) when a bona
fide adverse holder consents.5 Since consent to summary jurisdiction is
tion (i.e. what the transferor must do to make a transfer legally effective) are justifiable only
as instruments for its accomplishment, and that v.alidity of transfer is to be judged by
w:hether the funrcions of the transfer requirements have been fulfilled. The three barc
functions suggested are the rit alfunction (did the transferor do something which showed he
"deliberately intended to effectuate a transfer?"), the cvidentiary function (can the reliability
of the proof presented be demonstrated?) and the trolectire function (proof of safeguard
against undue influence, etc., usually a requirement of the statute of willW. In terms of this
analysis, it appears that the facts of the principal case show substantial fulfilment of both
the ritual (delivery of the policy) and the evidentiary function (the oral statements and con-
fidential report). The protective function is not applicable to inter vivos transfers.
* Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97 (1944), aff'g In re Gold Medal Laundries, 142 F. (2d)
301 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
1. BANKRUPTcy AcT § 23, 52 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 46 (1940). Section 23 of
the Bankruptcy Act applies only to plenary suits. Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U. S. 367
(1934); 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) , 23.03. Under Section 23(b) the receiver
or trustee may bring such suits only in the United States district courts sitting at law and
in equity where the bankrupt might have brought them had not bankruptcy intervened,
unless the defendant consents, except as provided in Sections 60, 67 and 70 of the Act.
2. BANKR U cY AcT § 41(b), 52 STAT. S59 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 69(b) (1940); B.2;n-
RupTcY AcT § 50(n), 52 STAT. 864 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 78(n) (1940); BA..ntKuPrcy Act
§ 57(1), 52 STAT. 867 (1938), 11 U.S. C. § 93(1) (1940); BA.'nUprCY AcT § 67(a), 52 STAT.
875 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 107(a) (1940); BANKRUPTCY AcT § 69(b), 52 STT. 879 (1938) 11
U. S. C. § 109(b) (1940).
3. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940); Straton v. New, 283
U. S. 318 (1931); Isaac v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (1931); City of Long
Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 602 (1939); 2
COLLIER, BANKRP TCY (14th ed. 1940) ' 23.04; MOORE, BANKrUTrCy MA.,NUAL (1939)
23.09; 5 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1936) § 2350; see Ross, Federal Juirdidckon irn
Suits by Trustees in Bankruptc. (1933) 20 IowA L. REv. 565,583-92.
4. May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925); 1 re Gant, 52 F. (2d) 220 (D. N. C. 1931);
American Finance Co. v. Cuppard, 45 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
5. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U. S. 191 (1926); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox,
264 U. S. 426 (1924); Galbraith v. Vallely, 256 U. S. 46, 50 (1921); Harris v. First Nat. BanI:,
216 U. S. 382, 383-5 (1910); Jaquith v. Rowley, 188 U. S. 620, 625-6 (1903); In re Para-
mount Fireproof Door Co., 43 F. (2d) 558 (E. D. N. Y. 1930); Marcell v. Engebretson, 74 F.
(2d) 93 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); 2 COLLIER, BANmRUpTCy (14th 6d. 1940) 23.06; MoroO,
BANKRuPTCY MANuAl. (1939) 23.06. As to what constitutes consent see Mooas, BAz l-
RuPTcY MANuAL (1939) 23.07.
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theoretically a waiver of the procedural right to a plenary determination of
given issues, 6 it may be given not only expressly by stipulation 7 but im-
pliedly by surrendering the property to the court or trustee,8 by voluntarily
invoking the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,9 or by failing to make a
timely objection to the summary proceeding.'
In defining "timeliness," the bankruptcy courts have been faced with the
practical problem that whether an adverse holder's claim of title is colorable
or bona fide usually cannot be adjudicated on the pleadings and supporting
affidavits alone." Accordingly, the propriety of summary procedure is often
ascertainable only after the court has heard the facts of the case. If at that
time the defendant's claim is found to be sham, the court may of course
enter a final order, since its findings on trial serve to justify both its assump-
tion of summary jurisdiction 12 and its decision.' On the other hand, if the
6. Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U. S. 160 (1938); Page v. Arkansas Natural
Gas, 286 U. S. 269 (1932); MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., 286 U. S. 263 (1932);
Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U. S. 191 (1926); Talcott v. Glavin, 104 F. (2d) 851 (C, C. A.
3d, 1939).
7. Bryant v. Swofford Bros. Drygoods Co., 214 U. S. 279 (1909); 2 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTcY (i4th ed. 1940) 23.08 and cases cited; MOORE, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1939)
23.08. Once given the consent cannot be withdrawn. In re Prokop, 65 F. (2d) 628 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1933).
8. In re Murray, 92 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); In re Kouri, 66 F. (2d) 241
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933); 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 23.08; MOORE, BANK-
RUPTCY MANUAL (1939) 23.08.9. In re Hadden Roedde Co., 135 Fed. 886 (E. D. Wis. 1904); First State Bank of
Crook, Colo. v. Fox, 10 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); In re White, 177 Fed. 194 (C. C. A.
7th, 1910); In re Riker, 109 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901); 2 COLLIER, BANKRUP"TCY (14th ed.
1940) 23.08; MOORE, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1939) 23.08.
10. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 23.08 and cases cited; MOORE, BANK-
RUPTCY MANUAL (1939) 23.08.
11. See Matter of Fuller, 294 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Matter of Kramer & Much-
nick, 218 Fed. 138 (E. D. Pa. 1914); Matter of Goldstein & Moseson, 216 Fed. 887 (C. C. A.
7th, 1914); cf. Matter of Midtown Contracting Co., 243 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), cerl.
denied sub nom. Wilds v. Dep't of Education, 245 U. S. 654 (1917); Matter of Gant, 52 F.
(2d) 220 (M. D. N. C. 1931).
12. "As every court must have power to determine, in the first instance, whether it has
jurisdiction to proceed, the bankruptcy court has, in every case, jurisdiction to determine
whether it has possession actual or constructive. It may conclude, where it lacks actual
possession, that the physical possession held by some persons is of such a nature that the
property is constructively within the possession of the court .... But in no case where it
lacked possession, could the bankruptcy court, under the law as originally enacted, nor can
it now (without consent) adjudicate in a summary proceeding the validity of a substantial
adverse claim." Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426, 433-4 (1934). See also
Stell v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); Atlanta Flooring & Insulation Co. v. Russell, 146 F.
(2d) 884 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945); Matter of Mt. Forest Fur Firms of America, Inc., 122 F. (2d)
232 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Matter of American Fidelity Corp., Ltd., 28 F. Supp. 462 (S. D.
Cal. 1939).
13. Moonblatt v. Kosmin, 139 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943); In re West Produce
Corp., 118 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Matter of Realty Associates Securities Corp.,
98 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); In re Murray, 92 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); Matter
of Prebronx Realty Corp., 17 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 346 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
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defendant's claim is found to be substantial,' 4 the court is placed in the
anomalous position of having heard all or part of a case on the merits while
it was technically without jurisdiction to speak. In such instances most
courts have held, for obvious reasons of practicability, that by not raising a
specific objection before going to trial the claimant impliedly consents.'9
Other courts, however, have evidently believed that the defendant by
alleging and proving that his claim is genuine not only pleads to the merits
but by definition challenges the jurisdiction, and have not found an implied
consent so long as an express objection is made before entry of the final
order.l6
Opportunity to resolve this confusion in the law wa-s squarely presented
to the Supreme Court in the recent case of Cline v. Kaplan.17 Cline, a trustee
in bankruptcy, petitioned the referee for an order directing Kaplan to turn
over certain assets in his possession. In his answer Kaplan claimed owner-
ship in himself and prayed for a dismissal of the petition without e.xplicitly
challenging the jurisdiction. After extensive hearings to determine title to
the property, but before the matter went to the referee for decision, I-aplan
moved to dismiss for want of summary jurisdiction. The referee granted the
motion, but was reversed by the district court. Finding that the objection to
jurisdiction had been made in "apt time," the Circuit Court of Appeals sus-
tained the referee's dismissal,'8 and the Supreme Court, hearing the case on
certiorari, affirmed.20
Citing. Louisille Trust, Company v. Comingor 21 as direct authority, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter broadly stated that "consent is not given even though
14. "Without entering upon a discussion of various cases in the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal in which divergent views have been expressed as to the test to be applied in determining
whether an adverse claim is substantial or merely colorable, we are of the opinion that it is
to be deemed of a substantial character when the claimant's contention 'discloes a con-
tested matter of right, involving some fair doubt and reasonable room for controvcrsy,'
Board of Education v. Leary [236 Fed. 521, 525 (C. C. A. Sth, 1916)], in matters either of
fact or law; and is not to be held merely colorable unless the preliminary inquiry shows that
it is so unsubstantial and obviously insufficient, either in fact or law as to be plainly without
color of merit, and a mere pretense. . . ." Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U. S. 191, 194-5
(1926); see also Atlanta Flooring & Insulation Co. v. Russell, 146 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. $th,
1945).
15. Moonblatt v. Kosmin, 139 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943); In re We3t Produce
Corp., 118 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Matter of Realty Asociates Securities Corp., 93
F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); In re Murray, 92 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); Matter of
Prebronx Realty Corp., 17 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 346 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); see 2 CoLuIE, BAN;Tr-
nupTcY (14th ed. 1940) 509; 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PwAcficu (1938) 649.
16. In re W"hite Satin IMills Inc., 25 F. (2d) 313 (D. C. Minn. 1931.; In re Gold Medal
Laundries, 142 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944), aff'd sub norn. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97
(1944); cf. Lundin v. Chubinsky, 22 F. Supp. 132 (S. D. N. Y. 193S).
17. 323 U. S. 97 (1944).
18. In re Gold Medal Laundries, 142 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944), a.ff'd sub rem.
Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944).
19. 65 Sup. Ct. 67 (U. S. 1944).
20. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944).
21. 134U.S. 18 (1902).
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claimant 'participated in the proceedings' provided formal objection is
made before entry of the final order." 22 Yet the fact situation of the Corn-
ingor case appears clearly distinguishable. Comingor, making it unmistak-
able that he intended questions of jurisdiction to be determined before those
of merit, had proceeded to trial only after specifically objecting to the
court's assumption of summary jurisdiction.23 Kaplan, on the contrary,
submitted to numerous hearings without prev'ious jurisdictional challenge.2 4
It would seem, therefore, that Cline v. Kaplan should have been treated by
the Supreme Court as a case of first impression.
Implicit in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's rejection 25 of the usual holding that
silent submission to a trial on the merits implies consent to the jurisdiction is
the hypothesis 26 that in summary proceedings a plea to the substantive
issues simultaneously assails the court's power to speak. But this view ap-
pears totally to disregard the general applicability to bankruptcy of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Y Under Rule 12(b) Kaplan could have
raised by motion the question of jurisdiction to proceed summarily before
pleading an answer, 2s or he could have presented in an answer all available
defenses and objections, including lack of summary jurisdiction, without
waiving any of his rights. 29 Failure to do so would seem to invoke Rule
12(h), which provides for automatic waiver of any defenses and objections
not raised by motion, answer, or reply. It is true that Rule 12(h) modifies
22. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97, 100 (1944).
23. "He did not come in voluntarily but in obedience to peremptory orders and al-
though he participated in the hearings, he had completed his claims in the outset . ... "
Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U. S. 18, 26 (1902). Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, who
wrote the opinion in the Comingor case, later said of it: "In that case, to a rule entered in the
bankruptcy court, requiring an adverse claimant in possession of a fund to pay it to a trustee
in bankruptcy, the claimant tendered a formal response denying jurisdiction, which the
court refused to-entertain, and he then participated in a hearing upon the merits." First
Nat. Bank of Chicagov. Chicago Title &Trust Co., 198 U. S. 280,289-90 (1905).
24. Clinev. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97, 98 (1944).
25. "We reject the suggestion that respondents conferred consent by participating in
the hearing on the merits." Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97, 100 (1944).
-26. See supra, p. 4 6 3 .
27. General Order in Bankruptcy 37 made the Federal Rules applicable to bank-
ruptcy proceedings: "In proceedings under the Act the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the
Act or with these general orders, be followed as nearly as may be. But the court may shorten
the limitations of time prescribed so as to expedite hearings, and may otherwise modify the
rules for the preparation or hearing of any particular proceeding." 305 U. S. 698 (1939).
28. While the defendant may present under Rule 12(b) every defense or objection
available to him in his answer, without waiving any of his rights, he may not desire to do so
for practical reasons. If so, he may present the following objections without the necessity of
pleading an answer: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) insufficiency of service
of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. RULES CIv.
PRoc., Rule 12(b).
29. Rule 12(b) provides in part: "No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion." '
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this general principle with the exception that "whenever it appears by sug-
gestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." - The inconsistency of this
exception clause with the bankruptcy law, however, and its consequent ir-
relevance thereto,31 is demonstrated by the fact that, while in ordinary civil
litigation one may never confer substantive jurisdiction upon a court by
consent or waiver,12 the power of bankruptcy courts to proceed summarily is
often gained in that manner.33 Applying Rule 12(b) "as nearly as may be," 31
therefore, the Supreme Court might well have found that Kaplan had
waived his objection to summary jurisdiction.
Moreover, considerations of expediency and fairness recommend this
result. The rule of the Cline case permits a defendant with a substantial
claim to join issue on the merits, hear his opponent's entire case, and then
raise the question of jurisdiction if he anticipates an adverse decision by the
referee. Not only is the defendant thereby given the inequitable advantage
of securing a second trial at will, but the resulting expense to the bankrupt's
estate of double litigation redounds directly to the loss of creditors. This
contravention of the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act appears especially un-
fortunate in view of the consent procedure available in the Federal Rules.
If the omission of the Rules as a factor in the Cline case 3 is interpreted
inferentially to mean that their waiver provisions, even if argued, would be
held inapplicable to summary proceedings, it seems likely that bankruptcy
trustees, the courts, or Congress will be forced to devise alternative means of
mitigating the present law.
30. FED. RULES Civ. PROC., Rule 12(h) (2).
31. The Federal Rules are applicable to bankruptcy only in so far as they are not in-
consistent with the Act or with the General Orders. See note 27 supra.
32. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (190S); 1 Moonn, FnDETL%
PRACTICE (1938) 12.10.
33. See notes 7,8,9, 10 supra.
34. General Order 37. 1Noonblatt v. Kosmin, 139 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) applied
Federal Rule 12(h) as not allowing a defendant to raise objection to the bankruptcy court's
lack of summary jurisdiction to proceed summarily dt any time. No mention is made in the
opinion of Rule 12(h) (2).
Even if the Comingor case had adjudicated the issue of the Cline case it would not be
controlling since it antedated the Federal Rules. The Comingor case was decided in 1902;
General Order 37 making the Federal Rules applicable to bankruptcy proceedings became
effective Feb. 13, 1939.
35. The Federal Rules were not mentioned in the briefs of either party nor in the
opinions of any of the courts which considered the Cline case.
